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Research in social and cultural psychology has identified that self-construal, or the way
the self is defined in relation to others, plays an important role in social decision-making
processes. Yet it remains difficult to isolate the effect of self-construal in a comparative
approach. Therefore, we used priming methodology in three studies to induce either
an independent or interdependent mindset to test direct consequences on fairness
considerations. Specifically, we asked whether participants would accept an unfair
ultimatum game offer: a split of 10 euros, where the participant is allocated the marginal
share of 3 and the proposer 7. If the participant refuses, neither gets paid. In the
first study, we used the well-known similarities and differences prime. Here, activating
an interdependent mindset decreased rejection of the unfair offer compared to the
independent mindset and control condition, but only in females. The prime did not affect
males. In the second and third study we modified our university’s mission statement to
instead include either independent or interdependent values. Females displayed a similar
direction of effects; in males however, activating an interdependent mindset increased
rejection. Taken together, the results show that whether participants accept or reject
an unfair offer depends on both their gender and the self-construal prime. The results
were interpreted using the distinction between relational independence that has been
associated with females, and collective interdependence, that has been associated with
males. Possible consequences for future studies are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Human social behavior does not follow the rational principles of economic models. Rather than
maximizing individual profit, decision-making is driven by social preferences like inequality
aversion, fairness, trust, and reciprocity (Weber et al., 2004; Balliet et al., 2009; Van Lange et al.,
2013). Even when people are given the option to divide a sum between themselves and a different
person without any possible repercussions or loss of face, the mode of behavior is generally a fair
division (Hoffman et al., 1996; Diekmann, 2004). In addition, there is marked variation both within
and between individuals, indicating that decision-making in social situations does not adhere to
universal principles. Part of this variation can be explained by individual attributes such as gender
and age (MacPherson et al., 2002; Deakin et al., 2004; Peters et al., 2007; Eckel and Grossman,
2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Balliet et al., 2011), while a substantial amount also originates
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in the group the individual belongs to Oosterbeek et al. (2004),
Wong and Hong (2005) and Gächter et al. (2010). However, it
has proven difficult to disentangle the psychological mechanisms
underlying differences in decision-making behavior (Grossmann
and Na, 2014). Here we focus on self-construal as a plausible
underlying psychological mechanism, and use priming in three
experimental studies to further elucidate variation in the way
people value outcomes for self and others.
Self-construal refers to the way the self is perceived
and defined in relation to others. Cross-cultural studies
demonstrate that self-construals differ between cultural groups.
In predominantly individualistic cultures, as for example seen
in Western European countries and North America, people
typically perceive themselves as unique and independent from
others (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1993). The self is
defined mainly in terms of internal attributes such as abilities
and attitudes (Markus and Kitayama, 1991), and agency and
assertiveness are valued traits, reflecting the independence of
action and opinion (Singhal and Nagao, 1993; Kashima et al.,
1995). In contrast, in predominantly collectivistic cultures, as
for example seen in East Asian countries, people typically
perceive themselves as interdependent (connected to others),
and the self is to a much greater degree defined in terms of
group memberships, relationships to family and friends as well
as social roles (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1993).
Similarities with others and common goals are more important
than in individualistic cultures (Trafimow et al., 1991). Harmony
is highly valued and conflict is avoided and even suppressed
(Ohbuchi et al., 1999; Carnevale and Leung, 2001; Tinsley and
Brett, 2001; Cai and Fink, 2002).
These global differences in self-construal between
individualistic and collectivistic cultures do not preclude
further variation between individuals within these cultures
(Na et al., 2010). Gender has been put forward as a prominent
source of variation in self-construal, with on average a more
interdependent self-construal in females (Cross and Madson,
1997). This is associated with a greater tendency to create close,
intimate relationships, to take the perspective of others, and to
maintain harmony and avoid conflict. Males on the other hand
construct a more independent self-construal, accompanied by
a preference for autonomy and emotional detachment from
others. This distinction has been further refined by Baumeister
and Sommer (1997), who argued that males equally construct
the self as interdependent, but seek to connect to a broader
group with a shared identity (e.g., supporting sports teams,
patriotism, fraternities, etc.). Where females primarily seek
intimate connections in a number of close personal dyadic
relationships, males orient to a larger sphere by seeking to
connect with a broader group; effectively seeking a larger
number of relationships, but investing less in one on one
interactions. The difference in interdependence between females
and males has been referred to as the relational vs. collective
distinction within interdependence (e.g., Kashima et al., 1995;
Gabriel and Gardner, 1999; Maddux and Brewer, 2005). This
has been demonstrated in a number of studies. For example,
in an online trust-dilemma game, females were more trusting
toward individuals with whom they shared a relationship or the
potential of a future relationship, whereas men primarily trusted
individuals if they were from the same social group (Maddux
and Brewer, 2005). This is in line with the notion that compared
to males, females tend to foster close relationships and prioritize
harmony maintenance, conflict avoidance and togetherness
more (Kashima et al., 1995; Cross and Madson, 1997). Similarly,
Van Vugt et al. (2007) found that in males, but not in females,
cooperation in a social dilemma game was increased when group
cohesion was triggered by manipulating intergroup competition
between the university they attended and a rival university.
The way individuals perceive themselves in relation to others
influences their cognition, emotion and motivation (Markus
and Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett et al., 2001; Grossmann et al.,
2012). With regard to decision-making, individuals with an
independent self-construal for example may rely on a cost-
benefit strategy, which maximizes the benefit of one’s choice for
personal gain (Weber and Hsee, 2000). In contrast, individuals
with an interdependent self-construal may be inclined to use
role-based strategies in decision-making, focusing on the rules
and expectations that come with certain social roles with the
aim of fostering social connectedness (March, 1994; Weber
and Hsee, 2000; Weber et al., 2005). There is indeed some
empirical evidence linking independent and interdependent
self-construals with different social decision-making strategies
(Howard et al., 2007; Van Prooijen et al., 2008; Emonds et al.,
2011). For example, in one cross-cultural study, individuals
with high levels of independent self-construals displayed more
competitive and less cooperative strategies than those with
high levels of interdependent self-construals, independent of
cultural group (European-American and Japanese) (Oetzel,
1998). Similarly, in a study investigating the relationships
between self-construal, cultural background, gender, and conflict
styles, Ting-Toomey et al. (2001) found that self-construal
provided a better explanation for conflict style than gender and
cultural background.
Experimental social dilemmas are well-suited to investigate
the motives underlying social decision-making, because their
design allows for quantifying the consequences of different
choices for the individual and the other person(s) involved.
Social dilemmas can be defined by two characteristics: (a)
individuals receive higher payoffs for making selfish choices, and
(b) everyone involved receives lower payoffs if everyone makes
selfish choices (Weber et al., 2004). There is abundant evidence
that decision-making in social dilemmas is not only influenced
by individual monetary gain, but also by the moral cost or benefit
associated with the action (Levitt and List, 2007; Sanfey, 2007;
Rilling et al., 2008; Tabibnia et al., 2008; Balliet et al., 2009).
A widely used social dilemma is the Ultimatum Game (e.g.,
Roth et al., 1991; Botelho et al., 2000; Henrich et al., 2001; Gil-
White, 2004; Hoffmann and Tee, 2006; Chuah et al., 2007, 2009;
Güth and Kocher, 2014). This is a two-player social dilemma
where a proposer suggests a division of a certain amount of
money, which the responder can either accept or reject—with
rejection resulting in neither party getting paid. The Ultimatum
Game is a simple game: the participants make a single choice.
Yet, the choice to accept or reject is a complex interplay between
motivations such as inequality aversion, negative reciprocity, and
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costly punishment (Güth and Kocher, 2014). It is likely that
these motivations will differ between people who view themselves
and their actions, goals and priorities as independent from
others; compared to people that construe an interdependent self-
construal, viewing themselves as more connected to others, with
shared goals and priorities.
Indeed, there is evidence for cultural and gender differences
in the Ultimatum Game (Solnick, 2001; Oosterbeek et al.,
2004; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Espinosa and Kovárˇík, 2015).
With regard to culture, a meta-analysis of 37 papers from 25
countries concluded that the average rejection rate of Asian
responders was higher than of responders in the U.S., albeit with
large heterogeneity between studies (Oosterbeek et al., 2004).
However, the review was not able to establish a link between
differences in rejection rate per country and cultural constructs
as individualism. With regard to gender, findings have also been
inconsistent. Using an Ultimatum Game design, Solnick (2001)
reported that females were less likely compared tomales to accept
low offers, while Eckel and Grossman (2001) found that they
wore more likely to accept such offers. Such inconsistencies are
likely to be due to situational constraints. In a review of six
social dilemma studies, Espinosa and Kovárˇík (2015) concluded
that females compared to males displayed more prosocial
behavior in experimental designs that highlight social cues. In
contrast, males, but not females showed less prosocial behavior in
decisions which were taken after deliberate processing compared
to more spontaneous decisions (Espinosa and Kovárˇík, 2015).
However, studies comparing either cultural or gender groups
cannot address the underlying mechanisms for why differences
are found (Oyserman, 2011; Oyserman et al., 2014). Rather than
comparing groups that are supposed to differ in self-construal,
or measuring individuals’ trait self-construal and relating that
to their decision-making, a more direct approach is to use
priming methods to induce interdependent or independent
mindsets and investigate the downstream consequences on
fairness considerations in the Ultimatum Game.
Various techniques are available to prime interdependent or
independent mindsets in the laboratory. For instance, Gabriel
and Gardner (1999) used pronoun circling to prime an either
independent or interdependent self-construal. Instructing North
American participants to circle interdependent pronouns (we,
ours) in a word search describing a trip to the city, resulted
in a shift of world views reflecting collectivist social values and
judgments, compared to when instructed to circle independent
pronouns (I, mine). Trafimow et al. (1991) primed self-
construal mindsets by instructing participants to think for 2
min what made them either different from their close friends
and family (the independent condition) or what makes them
similar (interdependent condition). Following the Similarities
and Differences With Friends and Family prime, they were asked
to complete 20 open-ended statements that started with “I am..”
(Kuhn and McPartland, 1954). The participants who received
instructions to think about what made them different from their
close others reported more self-oriented responses reflecting
personal attributes (e.g., I am clever, tall, etc.), while participants
who received instructions to think about what made themselves
similar reported more other-oriented responses reflecting social
roles or qualities (e.g., I am a daughter, I am thoughtful of other’s
needs).
In the following, we report three studies that investigated the
downstream consequences of independent and interdependent
mindsets on fairness considerations, over and above individuals’
trait self-construal. Participants were first primed with an
independent or interdependentmindset, and then presented with
a single 7-3 offer by a proposer in an Ultimatum Game. The 7-3
offer was used because prior work shows that the offer borders
between being considered fair or unfair; most participants
will accept a division of 50 – 40% of the total stake, while
offers of less than 20% will most likely be rejected (e.g., Güth
and Kocher, 2014). The 7-3 offer balances between triggering
the motivation of monetary gain, and fairness considerations:
while a division of 30% can be considered “unfair,” it is also
better than receiving nothing. To exclude unwanted effects from
proposer characteristics, we presented the offer as coming from
an anonymous other. At the end of the studies participants
completed a self-construal questionnaire. We predicted that
an accessible interdependent mindset would result in a lower
rejection rate of the Ultimatum Game offer, because it has been
shown to bring connectedness and harmony to mind compared
to an accessible independent mindset, that is shown to bring
uniqueness and competitiveness to mind (Utz, 2004; Kim et al.,
2006; Lee et al., 2010; Mourey et al., 2013). We predicted these
effects to occur over and above participants’ trait self-construals,
but included trait self-construal in the analyses to explore
possible interaction effects. In addition, we included gender for
two reasons. First, an extensive collection of previous research
has pointed out the role of gender in social decision-making (e.g.,
Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Espinosa
and Kovárˇík, 2015). Second, gender has been attributed as a key
factor in determining variations in self-construal (e.g., Cross and
Madson, 1997).
STUDY 1
In the first study we tested our predictions as detailed next by
using the well-known and often used Similarities and Differences
with Friends and Family task (SDFF) as the priming task
(Trafimow et al., 1991). Previous research has established that
this task can effectively prime self-construal (Trafimow et al.,
1991; Ybarra and Trafimow, 1998; Holland et al., 2004; Oyserman
and Lee, 2008; Lee and Jeyaraj, 2014). Thinking of similarities
with close others decreases subjective interpersonal distance,
while thinking of differences enhances such distance. It has
successfully been applied in a variety of experimental setups,
showing consistent moderate to high effect sizes (Oyserman and
Lee, 2008). In our study participants were randomized into one
of the three conditions: no-prime control, independent mindset,
and interdependent mindset condition. Following the prime,
they were presented with the UltimatumGame offer: participants
were asked whether they would accept or reject a 10 euro
division, in which they are allocated the marginal share of 3
euro. Our predictions were threefold. First, we predicted that
the participants in the interdependent condition would be more
likely to accept the offer than participants in the independent
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condition. Second, given that the study was conducted in the
Netherlands, which is classified as a typically individualistic
society where people are likely to have a trait independent
mindset (Hofstede et al., 1991), we expected no differences in
the rejection rates between those in the no-prime control and
those in the independent mindset condition. Third, we predicted




A total of 226 university students participated in the study
(47% male; 69% Dutch; the other 31% consisted of a diverse
and fractured population: the largest subpopulations were from
Suriname (4.4%), Morocco (4.4%) Turkey (4%), Iran (2.2%),
and Germany (2.2%)1; Mage = 22.6, SD = 5.8, age range: 18–
33 years). Participants were randomly assigned into one of
the three conditions: independent-mindset condition (n = 75;
47% male), interdependent-mindset condition (n = 75; 48%
male), and no-prime control condition (n =76; 47% male). The
study allowed advanced registration online, or walk-ins. As the
experiment was conducted in Dutch, students were required to
speak Dutch fluently. Active informed consent was obtained, and
experimental procedures were approved by the ethical committee
of the Faculty of Behavioural andMovement Sciences of the Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam (VUA). As detailed below, participants
were paid for participation.
Procedure and Materials
The study consisted of a prime followed by a one-shot
Ultimatum Game and self-construal questionnaire, which were
all computerized. Before participation, participants filled out a
consent form, which described the study as a brief investigation
of decision-making. The study started with a welcome screen
and brief instructions about the Ultimatum Game. Participants
were explained they would be presented with a proposal for a 10
euro split from an anonymous other student, who was randomly
selected from the previous participant pool. They were also told
that if they accepted the offer, a division would bemade according
to the proposed offer on top of the base fee; if they rejected
nobody would receive an additional bonus. They were then told
that they would first start with a neutral task, to clear their mind
before commencing with the game.
Priming
The intermittent task framed as neutral, was the SDFF prime
adopted from Trafimow et al. (1991). Participants in the
independent-mindset condition were asked to think and write
down for 2min whatmade them different from their close friends
and family. Participants in the interdependent-mindset condition
were asked to write what they thought made them similar. In the
no-prime control condition participants proceeded directly with
the Ultimatum Game.
1Due to the small size and diversity of the groups it was not possible to take
race/ethnicity into account in the analyses.
Ultimatum game
The social dilemma was a one-shot Ultimatum Game.
The dependent variable was rejection rate: participants
had to decide whether to accept or reject an offer where
the anonymous proposer would receive 7 euro, and the
participant 3.
Self-construal scale
The Ultimatum Game was followed by a trait self-construal
scale (TSC) consisting of 10 items, of which half measured trait
independent self-construal (e.g., “I don’t care what other people
think about me, as long as I am happy”; α = 0.71) and half
measured trait interdependent self-construal (e.g., “Relationships
with others are more important than my own accomplishments”;
α = 0.75). The scale consisted of a modified version of the
Oyserman (1993) scale, translated to Dutch. Participants rated
themselves on a 7-point scale (1 = does not describe me at all to
7= describes me very well).
Finally, participants were asked to indicate their age, gender,
study enrollment, and ethnicity for demographic analysis.
Participants were then debriefed; they were informed that the
offer was fixed, and the neutral task consisted of a prime designed
to make an independent or interdependent self-construal salient
in the different priming conditions. At the end of the study
participants were thanked and paid. Payment consisted of a base
fee of €2, with a bonus of €0.30 if they accepted the proposed
offer.
Analyses Plan
A logistic regression analysis was conducted to analyze whether
a model with the predictors condition (independent prime,
interdependent prime and no-prime control) and gender
provided a better fit at predicting the binary outcome of
rejection rate (accept or reject) on the Ultimatum Game than
a null (intercept-only) model. A logistic regression model
with categorical predictors examines pairwise interactions of
rejection rate of gender across the different conditions; only
comparisons between cells are analyzed (e.g., the difference
between priming interdependence vs. independence for
males, or the difference between males and females in the
interdependent-prime condition), and does not compute
the overall effect of condition or gender as an ANOVA
analysis.
Pairwise interactions were examined to analyze rejection
rate of gender across the different conditions. The odds ratio
are reported with 95% confidence intervals. The estimated
probabilities of rejection rate were indexed by the partial logistic
regression coefficients (B-values) of the means of gender within
the different conditions, means of conditions within gender, and
the interaction between gender and condition.
In order to examine the extent to which trait levels of
independence and interdependence moderated the outcome of
condition on the UltimatumGame, a ratio score of independence
and interdependence scores was computed and included as a
predictor in the analysis. A higher score on TSC indicated
a higher ratio of interdependence. All two- and three-way
interaction effects were included in the model.
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Results
Descriptives
Overall, 42.7% of the participants in the interdependent-mindset
condition rejected the offer (RO) in the Ultimatum Game,
compared to 58.7% of the participants in the independent-
mindset condition, and 56.6% of the participants in the control
condition. To examine whether participants differed in trait levels
of independence or interdependence as a function of condition
and gender, a two-way ANOVA was performed with TSC as the
dependent variable. Only a main effect of gender was found,
F(1, 220) = 8.39, p = 0.004, Cohen’s d = 0.39. Overall, males
reported a higher ratio of independence to interdependence (M
= −0.23, SD = 0.69) than females (M = –0.02, SD = 0.38). TSC
did not differ between the three conditions.
The Ultimatum Game
We conducted a logistic regression including condition, gender,
TSC, and all two- and three-way interaction effects as predictors
(Table 1). The analysis revealed a non-significant three-way
interaction between the independent and interdependent-
mindset conditions with gender and TSC: Wald χ2
(1, N = 226)
=
2.92, p = 0.09. The two-way interaction between gender and the
independent-mindset and interdependent-mindset conditions
was significant [Wald χ2
(1, N = 226)
= 5.17, p= 0.02].
The results showed that females rejected less when they
were primed with interdependence (RO = 33.3%) compared
to when they were primed with independence (RO = 62.5%),
Wald χ2
(1, N = 226)
= 7.31, p = 0.007, or when they were not
primed at all (RO = 57.5%), Wald χ2
(1, N = 226)
= 4.23, p =
0.04. The standardized regression values indicated that females
in the interdependent condition were 3.7 times less likely to
reject the offer than those in the independent condition, and 2.6
times less likely to reject than those in the control condition.
Females in the independent condition did not differ from those
in the control condition. Males on the other hand did not
respond differently based on the different priming conditions
(ROindependent = 54.3%, ROinterdependent = 52.8%, ROcontrol =
57.5%) (Figure 1).
The difference betweenmales and females was only significant
in the interdependent mindset condition, where males rejected
more often than females, Wald χ2
(1, N = 226)
= 3.81, p = 0.05.
As expected, the interactions with trait self-construal were not
significant.
Discussion
We predicted that participants in the interdependent mindset
condition would reject the offer less than those in the
independent mindset and the no-prime control condition,
over and above participants’ trait self-construals. Our results
partially support these two predictions. While an accessible
interdependent mindset indeed resulted in a lower rejection rate,
this was only true for females. Male participants’ rejection rate
of the offer did not differ as a function of condition. These
findings were not influenced by participants’ trait self-construals.
Moreover, despite that females reported higher trait levels of
interdependent self-construal, there were no differences between
TABLE 1 | Study 1: Regression model for the predictors condition, gender,
CO; and the two- and three-way interaction effects on rejection rate.
β SE Wald p eβ 95% CI
FEMALES
Conditiona (IND) 1.31 0.48 7.31 0.007** 3.69 [1.43, 9.49]
Conditiona (CTRL) 0.97 0.47 4.23 0.04* 2.63 [1.05, 6.60]
TSC (IND) 0.94 0.84 1.26 0.26 2.57 [0.49, 13.32]
TSC (INTER) −0.32 1.06 0.09 0.76 0.73 [0.09, 5.85]
TSC (CTRL) 1.30 1.49 0.76 0.38 3.66 [0.20, 67.96]
TSC × Conditiona (IND) 1.26 1.36 0.87 0.35 3.54 [0.25, 50.40]
TSC × Conditiona (CTRL) 1.62 1.83 0.78 0.38 5.04 [0.14, 182.54]
MALES
Conditiona (IND) −0.32 0.53 0.37 0.54 0.72 [0.26, 2.04]
Conditiona (CTRL) −0.13 0.54 0.06 0.81 0.88 [0.31, 2.52]
TSC (IND) −0.78 0.74 1.12 0.29 0.46 [0.11, 1.94]
TSC (INTER) 1.80 1.63 1.21 0.27 6.02 [0.25, 147.52]
TSC (CTRL) −0.21 0.78 0.08 0.78 0.81 [0.17, 3.75]
TSC × Conditiona (IND) −2.58 1.79 2.07 0.15 0.08 [0.01, 2.54]
TSC × Conditiona (CTRL) −2.01 1.81 1.23 0.27 0.13 [0.01, 4.65]
INDEPENDENT CONDITION
Genderb −0.64 0.50 1.59 0.21 0.53 [0.20, 1.42]
Genderb × TSC −1.72 1.12 2.38 0.12 0.18 [0.02, 1.60]
INTERDEPENDENT CONDITION
Genderb 0.99 0.51 3.81 0.05* 2.70 [1.00, 7.32]
Genderb × TSC 2.12 1.95 1.18 0.28 8.30 [0.18, 377.59]
CONTROL CONDITION
Genderb −0.10 0.50 0.04 0.84 0.90 [0.34, 2.41]
Genderb x TSC −1.51 1.68 0.81 0.37 0.22 [0.01, 5.97]
GENDER BY CONDITION INTERACTIONS
Genderb × Conditiona
(IND)
−1.63 0.72 5.17 0.03* 0.20 [0.05, 0.80]
Genderb × Conditiona
(CTRL)
−1.10 0.71 2.37 0.12 0.33 [0.08, 1.35]
Genderb × TSC ×
Conditiona (IND)
−3.84 2.25 2.92 0.09+ 0.02 [0, 1.76]
Genderb × TSC ×
Conditiona (CTRL)
−3.63 2.58 1.99 0.16 0.03 [0, 4.13]
Constantab −0.69 0.34 4.11 0.04* 0.50
aReference category = interdependent primed.
bReference category = female. IND, independent priming condition; INTER,
interdependent priming condition; CTRL, control condition. +p < 0.1, *p < 0.05,
**p < 0.01.
females and males in the no-prime control condition. These
findings suggests that participants’ gender affects sensitivity to
the mindset prime, rather than a priori resulting in different
decisions in the Ultimatum Game.
These findings are in line with a recent review concluding
that there are no differences between males and females in
social dilemmas with a neutral experimental framing, while
cues highlighting the social context of the dilemma lead to
more prosocial behavior in females (Espinosa and Kovárˇík,
2015). Other results also coincide with the notion that females
are generally more sensitive to the relational aspects of
interdependence than males (Cross and Madson, 1997; Maddux
and Brewer, 2005). In our study, thinking and writing about
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FIGURE 1 | Study 1: Average rejection rate of males and females in the priming conditions.
similarities with close others could have triggered these relational
aspects of interdependence, and may therefore have had a
stronger effect in females than males.
In contrast, it has been suggested that males are more sensitive
to the collective aspect of interdependence (Baumeister and
Sommer, 1997; Gabriel and Gardner, 1999). This collectivity
refers to feeling connected to peers with a shared identity
or group membership. The distinction between relational and
collective interdependence has been put forward to explain
gender differences in sociality in terms of the male and female
motivations to connect to different spheres (Baumeister and
Sommer, 1997). This differencemay also affect outcomes in social
dilemma’s. In the following two studies we further examined if
the nature of the prime may have triggered the gender difference
in the effect on participants fairness considerations. As Study 1
suggested that females are more than males influenced by having
relational interdependence on their mind, we tested whether
males would be more influenced by a prime triggering collective
interdependence in Study 2.
STUDY 2
We developed a new prime using a modified university mission
statement. Participants read a text about collective norms of
how students at the university are expected to behave among
their peers. Participants were randomly assigned into one of
the two conditions: independent mindset and interdependent
mindset condition. Participants in the independent mindset
condition read about the importance of being independent,
having one’s own opinion, being unique, and having personal
goals. Participants in the interdependent mindset condition
read about the importance of being honest, equal, social, and
interpersonal. The crucial difference between this new prime
and the previous Similarities and Differences prime is that in
Study 2 we tap into a collective identity (that of the university
to which the students belong). Following the prime, participants
were again asked whether they would accept or reject a 7-3 offer
in an Ultimatum Game.
Our predictions were twofold. First, we predicted that the
participants in the interdependent condition would be more
likely to accept the offer than participants in the independent
condition. Yet, given that the interdependent prime now elicits
collective rather than relational interdependence, we expected
that the condition effect would be more pronounced in males
than females. Second, we predicted that thesemindset and gender
effects would be shown over and above participants’ trait self-
construals. As we had established a baseline rejection rate in a no-
prime control condition, we did not include a control condition
in order to allocate the available population to the two priming
conditions to ensure enough statistical power.
Methods
Participants
A total of 180 students participated in the study (39% male; 81%
Dutch,Mage= 22.50, SD= 2.77, age range: 18–29 years). Both the
independent- and interdependent-mindset conditions consisted
of 90 participants (35 males, 55 females). Due to characteristics of
the prime, participants were required to be a registered student,
as well as speak Dutch fluently. Active informed consent was
obtained, and experimental procedures were approved by the
ethical committee of the Faculty of Behavioural and Movement
Sciences. Participants were not paid, but received a candy bar
upon completion.
Materials and Procedure
The study was conducted in the seating area of the main building
of the Vrije Universiteit. The location provided access to a
large and varied student population. The experiment consisted
of a printed booklet, that could be completed within a few
minutes. The booklets of both conditions were randomized
and conducted in a 2-week period. Prior to the last day
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 April 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 503
Flinkenflogel et al. Priming, Gender, and Fairness Considerations
of data collection, the collected data were summarized over
gender and condition in order to balance the remaining
booklets.
Priming
A new prime was devised, consisting of a modified version
of the VUA mission statement. Instead of the projected long
term goals and values of the university, the statement was
modified to represent values consistent with an independent
or interdependent self-construal. In addition, the VUA logo
was included, with a modified slogan (the standard slogan is
“looking forward”). In the independent-prime condition the
text now read (translation from Dutch):“The VU has a clear
policy concerning the goals and values on campus. The VU
emphasizes that students should develop independence and having
their own opinion. VU students are encouraged to develop skills
that make them a unique individual. Students should maintain
personal goals.” In the interdependent-prime condition, the
underlined words were replaced by: honesty, equality, social,
and interpersonal (underlining for clarification, not presented
during experimental presentation). The VU logo was positioned
in the top right corner, with the underlying text “everyone
unique” in the independent-mindset condition, and “everyone
equal” in the interdependent-mindset condition. The statement
was followed by the question “Do you agree with the following
statements:” “Do you recognize the VU students in the description
above?” and “Do you recognize yourself in the description above?”
Answers were given on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “not at all” to
5= “completely”)2.
Ultimatum Game
The social dilemma was again a one-shot Ultimatum Game
offer with rejection rate as binary dependent variable.
Participants had to decide whether to accept or reject
an offer of 7 for the anonymous proposer, and 3 for the
participant.
Self-construal scale
The Ultimatum Game was followed by the same TSC as in Study
1 consisting of 10 items; 5 independent items (α = 0.69) and 5
interdependent items (α= 0.63).
Demographics
Finally, participants were asked to complete their age,
gender and ethnicity, as well as provided the option of
leaving a remark concerning the study. Participants were
debriefed upon completion and awarded a candy bar for their
participation.
Analyses Plan
As in Study 1, we conducted a regression analysis with condition,
gender and TSC as predictors, and rejection rate as binary
outcome to examine whether this model provided a better fit than
an intercept-only model. All two- and three-way interactions
were included.
2We took these questions into account in our analyses, but no effects were found.
Results
Descriptives
Overall, 61% of the participants in the interdependent-mindset
condition rejected the offer (RO) in the Ultimatum Game,
compared to 57% of the participants in the independent-
mindset condition. As in Study 1, a two-way ANOVA was
performed to examine whether trait levels of independence
and interdependence differed as a function of gender and
condition. Females reported a higher ratio of interdependence to
independence (M = 0.05, SD= 0.21) than males (M = –0.05, SD
= 0.25), F(1, 176) = 7.37, p= 0.007, Cohen’s d= 0.41. TSC did not
differ between the conditions.
Analysis of the Ultimatum Game
A logistic regression with the predictors gender, condition, TSC
including all two- and three-way interactions was conducted
(Table 2). As in Study 1, the analysis revealed a significant
interaction between gender and condition: Wald χ2
(1, N = 180)
=
5.69, p= 0.02. The interaction effect indicated males and females
displayed a different pattern of fairness consideration based on
the priming conditions. Specifically, males rejected the offer
more often when primed with interdependence (RO = 77.1%)
compared to independence (RO = 48.6%), Wald χ2
(1, N =180)
=
5.39, p = 0.02. Rejection rate of females on the other hand was
not significantly influenced by condition (p = 0.38); females
TABLE 2 | Study 2: Regression model for the predictors condition, gender,
CO, and the two- and three-way interaction effects on rejection rate.
β SE Wald p eβ 95% CI
FEMALES
Conditiona 0.37 0.43 0.78 0.38 1.46 [0.63, 3.35]
TSC (IND) 0.13 0.73 0.03 0.86 1.14 [0.27, 4.78]
TSC (INTER) −1.04 0.83 1.57 0.21 0.35 [0.07, 1.80]
TSC × Conditiona 1.18 1.11 1.13 0.29 3.24 [0.37, 28.38]
MALES
Conditiona −1.31 0.56 5.39 0.02* 0.27 [0.09, 0.82]
TSC (IND) −1.47 1.93 0.58 0.45 0.23 [0.01, 10.13]
TSC (INTER) −2.99 1.95 2.36 0.12 0.05 [0.01, 2.29]
TSC × Conditiona 1.53 2.74 0.31 0.58 4.60 [0.02, 993.83]
INDEPENDENT CONDITION
Genderb −1.15 0.49 5.63 0.02 0.32 [0.12, 0.82]
Genderb × TSC −1.60 2.06 0.60 0.44 0.20 [0.01, 11.53]
INTERDEPENDENT CONDITION
Genderb 0.53 0.51 1.08 0.30 1.70 [0.62, 4.66]
Genderb × TSC −1.95 2.12 0.85 0.36 0.14 [0.01, 9.06]
GENDER BY CONDITION INTERACTIONS
Genderb × Conditiona −1.69 0.71 5.69 0.02* 0.19 [0.05, 0.74]
Genderb × TSC ×
Conditiona
0.35 2.96 0.01 0.91 1.42 [0.01, 468.01]
Constantab 0.60 0.30 4.06 0.04* 1.82
aReference category = interdependent primed.
bReference category = female. IND, independent priming condition; INTER,
interdependent priming condition.
*p < 0.05.
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in the independent condition rejected the offer more often
when primed with independence (RO = 72.7%) compared to
interdependence (RO = 61.8%) (Figure 2). When primed with
independence, females were three times more likely to reject the
offer thanmales,Wald χ2
(1, N =180)
= 5.63, p= 0.02. Rejection rate
between males and females did not differ in the interdependent
mindset condition. Similar to Study 1, trait self-construal did not
influence the effects.
Discussion
Study 2 further explored the influence of gender on fairness
considerations as a function of one’s self-construal mindset.
Where Study 1 showed that females rejected the Ultimatum
Game offer less when primed with relational interdependence
than independence, Study 2 examined whether males would be
influenced by themindset conditions when collective, rather than
relational interdependence was activated. Indeed, in line with our
predictions we found that differences in fairness considerations
as a function of interdependent and independent mindsets
were more pronounced in males in Study 2 than in Study 1.
However, the direction of the effect in males was opposite to our
expectation: activating a collective interdependent compared to
an independent mindset increased rejection rate in males.
A possible post-hoc explanation for this unexpected effect
may be that the collective interdependent prime elicited norm
enforcing behavior inmales. Highlighting a collective identity has
been associated with a greater tendency for norm enforcement
(Horne, 2007). Likely, receiving an offer that can be considered
unfair violates with the prescribed collective norm of acting social
and keeping others’ goals and priorities in mind, as phrased in
the interdependent prime. Baumeister and Sommer (1997) have
argued that compared to females, males have a greater sensitivity
toward the collective aspects of interdependence. Following a
different sensitivity to the mindset prime, receiving an unfair
offer may have triggered norm enforcing behavior in males,
resulting in a higher rejection rate.
Taken together, Study 2 suggests that males and females
differ in their sensitivity to a collective mindset prime. In
Study 3 we tested the robustness of this effect by replicating
the study in a controlled laboratory environment, at two
FIGURE 2 | Study 2: Average rejection rate of males and females in the
priming conditions.
different universities. Additionally, we added a manipulation
check to examine whether differences between the conditions
could be contributed to the activation of different self-construal
mindsets.
STUDY 3
Study 3 was nearly identical to Study 2. Differences were that
the study took place in the laboratory and at two universities
and amanipulation check was added. Participants were randomly
assigned into the independent or interdependent mindset
condition. They started by reading the modified university
mission statement, after which they were asked whether they
would accept or reject a 7-3 offer in an UG, and to complete
“I am” statements before providing demographics. We expected
that the findings of Study 2 would be replicated: males would
reject relatively more when primed with interdependence, while
females would reject more when primed with independence.
Methods
Participants
The data were collected at two locations: the University of
Amsterdam (UvA) (N = 83, 29%male), and the Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam (VUA) (N = 97, 47% male). In total 180 students
participated in the study (39% male, 86% Dutch, Mage = 21.44,
SD = 2.75, age range: 18–31 years). Both the independent- and
interdependent-mindset conditions consisted of 90 participants
(35 males, 55 females). Due to characteristics of the prime,
participants were required to be a registered student, as well
as speak Dutch fluently. Active informed consent was obtained,
and experimental procedures were approved by the ethical
committee of the Faculty of Behavioural andMovement Sciences.
Participants were paid identical to Study 1.
Materials and Procedure
The study was conducted in two locations. The first location was
in the lab of the VUA, and the second in the lab of the UvA.
The experiment was constructed with Qualtrics software (version
26,568). Participants were randomized into the two priming
conditions, taking gender into account to create even cells.
Similar to Studies 1 and 2, the experiment consisted of the prime
followed by a one-shot, two-way Ultimatum Game and self-
construal questionnaire. Before participation, participants filled
out a consent form, and read an information sheet containing
instructions about the Ultimatum Game. They were then told
that they would first start with a neutral task, to clear their mind
before commencing with the game. However, two modifications
were included based on the novelty of the Mission prime. First,
after the Ultimatum Game offer was presented, participants
were asked to recall the content of the mission prime presented
earlier. The question served as a check to establish whether the
participants had properly read the prime, as well as allowing us
to infer what they had summarized as the core meaning of the
text. This was then followed by the second modification, which
consisted of the manipulation check. The study was completed
by the TSC and demographics as described in Studies 1 and 2.
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Priming
The prime was the same Mission prime employed in Study
2, consisting of an independent and interdependent condition.
In the independent condition students were told the university
encourages independence and having an own opinion, as
well as being unique and focusing on personal goals. In
the interdependent mindset condition students were told the
university values honesty, equality, and that they were expected
to act social and keep others’ goals in mind. Following the prime,
participants were asked to rate on a 5-point scale to which degree
the content applied to themselves and their peers.
Ultimatum game
The social dilemma was again a one-shot Ultimatum Game offer
of with rejection rate as binary dependent variable. Participants
decided whether to accept or reject an offer of 7 for the
anonymous proposer, and 3 for the participant.
Manipulation check
A shorter version of Kuhn and McPartland’s (1954) Twenty
Statements Test was included as a manipulation check for
the self-construal prime. Participants were asked to complete
10 (instead of twenty) open-ended sentences starting with “I
am.” Their responses were coded as either independent or
interdependent as follows: responses that described a personal
trait (e.g., I am intelligent, pretty, tall) or feeling (I am happy,
stressed) were encoded as independent, while responses that
described a social role (e.g., I am a partner, sister), group
membership (e.g., I am a psychology student, male, or inhabitant
of Amsterdam) or social qualities (e.g., I am empathetic, I am
someone who cares about others) were coded as interdependent
(Agrawal and Maheswaran, 2005; Lee and Jeyaraj, 2014).
Self-construal scale
The Ultimatum Game was followed by the same self-construal
scale (TSC) as in Study 1 consisting of 10 items; 5 independent
items (α= 0.63) and interdependent items (α= 0.60).
Demographics
Finally, participants were asked to complete their age, gender
and ethnicity, as well as provided the option of leaving a
remark concerning the study. Participants were debriefed upon
completion.
Analyses Plan
As in Studies 1 and 2, we conducted a regression analysis with
condition, gender and TSC as predictors to examine whether
this model provided a better fit than an intercept-only model.
All two- and three-way interactions were included. Initially
we conducted a regression analysis to examine whether the
outcomes differed as a function of location (VUA lab vs. UvA
lab. There were no significant differences in overall rejection
rate based on location, nor was there an interaction effect
between condition and location, or between gender, condition
and location. Therefore, the similar direction of effects provided
us with enough confidence to merge the data sets from the
different locations.
Responses in the manipulation check (Twenty Statements
Task) were analyzed by conducting a two-way ANOVA with
gender and condition as factors. The number of interdependent3
responses was divided by the total number of responses from each
participant (Trafimow et al., 1991; Lee and Jeyaraj, 2014).
Results
Descriptives
As in Study 1, a two-way ANOVA was performed to examine
whether trait levels of independence and interdependence
differed as a function of gender and condition. Only a main effect
of gender was established: F(1, 176) = 9.441, p = 0.002, Cohen’s
d = 0.46. Females reported a higher ratio of interdependence
(M = 0.09, SD = 0.40) compared to males (M = –0.08,
SD = 0.21). There was no significant difference between the
priming conditions.
Analysis of the Manipulation Check
A two-way ANOVA with gender and condition as factors,
revealed that participants in the interdependent-mindset
condition reported a higher number of interdependent-relevant
responses (M = 1.35, SD = 0.17) than participants in the
independent-mindset condition (M = 1.27, SD = 0.17), F(1, 168)
= 10.84, p = 0.001, d = 0.51. Additionally, females reported
more interdependent-relevant responses (M = 1.34, SD = 0.17)
than males (M = 1.26, SD = 0.17), F(1, 168) = 12.14, p = 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 0.54.
Analysis of the Ultimatum Game
A binary logistic regression was conducted with condition,
gender, TSC, and all two- and three-way interactions. The
analysis revealed a three-way interaction between gender, TSC
and condition: Wald χ2
(1, N = 180)
= 6.08, p = 0.01. The three-
way interaction indicated participants’ self-construal was also
instrumental in determining the outcome of the decision. Based
on the three-way interaction, the analysis of the hypothesized
two-way interaction between gender and condition was followed
up by an analysis of the interaction between self-construal and
condition for males and females separately, and between gender
and self-construal for the two conditions separately.
Similar to Studies 1 and 2, we established a significant
interaction effect between gender and the priming conditions,
Wald χ2
(1, N = 180)
= 4.10, p = 0.04 (Table 3), indicating males
and females displayed a different pattern over the two priming
conditions. Males rejected the offer more often when primed
with interdependence (RO = 68.6%) compared to independence
(RO = 48.6%). While the effect size was similar to Study 2, the
effect was non-significant (p = 0.38). Females on the other hand
rejected the offer more often when primed with independence
(RO= 70.9%) compared to interdependence (50.9%) (Figure 3).
Wald χ2
(1, N = 180)
= 4.66, p = 0.03; females primed with
interdependence were 2.5 times more likely to accept the offer,
compared to when primed with independence. When comparing
between gender, the difference between males and females
in the independent-mindset condition was significant, Wald
3Responses were coded binary similar to Lee and Jeyaraj (2014), so there was no
difference between using the independent or interdependent responses.
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TABLE 3 | Study 3: Regression model for the predictors condition, gender,
CO; and the two- and three-way interaction effects on rejection rate.
β SE Wald p eβ 95% CI
FEMALES
Conditiona 0.91 0.42 4.66 0.03* 2.47 [1.09, 5.62]
TSC (IND)
TSC (INTER) 0.40 1.36 0.09 0.77 1.49 [0.10, 21.61]
TSC × Conditiona −1.25 1.95 0.41 0.52 0.29 [0.01, 13.25]
MALES
Conditiona −0.47 0.54 0.77 0.38 0.63 [0.22, 1.78]
TSC (IND)
TSC (INTER) −7.75 3.45 5.04 0.03* 0.01 [0.01, 0.37]
TSC × Conditiona 8.95 3.64 6.03 0.01** 7672.63 [6.09, 9672783.75]
INDEPENDENT CONDITION
Genderb −0.96 0.46 4.42 0.04* 0.38 [0.16, 0.94]
Genderb × TSC 2.04 1.82 1.26 0.26 7.70 [0.22, 271.83]
INTERDEPENDENT CONDITION
Genderb 0.42 0.50 0.68 0.41 1.51 [0.57, 4.06]
Genderb × TSC −8.15 3.71 4.82 0.03* 0.01 [0.01, 0.42]
GENDER BY CONDITION INTERACTIONS
Genderb ×
Conditiona
−1.38 0.68 4.10 0.04* 0.25 [0.07, 0.96]
Genderb × TSC ×
Conditiona
10.19 4.13 6.08 0.01** 266687.42 [8.08, 880981.38]
Constantab 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.99 1.00
aReference category = interdependent primed.
bReference category = female. IND, independent priming condition; INTER,
interdependent priming condition.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.




(1, N = 180)
= 4.42, p = 0.04; when primed with independence,
females were 2.6 times more likely to reject the offer than males.
The difference between gender in the interdependent condition
was not significant.
However, the gender differences were further qualified by
significant two-way interactions with trait self-construal. First,
there was a significant TSC × Condition interaction in males,
Wald χ2
(1, N = 180)
= 6.03, p = 0.01. Specifically, trait self-
construal affected male decision-making in the interdependent
condition, Wald χ2
(1, N = 180)
= 5.04, p = 0.03, but not
in the independent condition. In addition, there was a
significant interaction between gender and self-construal in the
interdependent mindset condition, Wald χ2
(1, N = 180)
= 4.82, p
= 0.03, but not in the independent condition. The two-way
interactions can be explained as follows: while males rejected
the offer more often when primed with interdependence, trait
self-construal affected the outcome of their decision; specifically,
when primed with interdependence, males with a relatively high
level of independence rejected the offer more often than those
with a high level of interdependence. For females however,
trait self-construal did not affect the outcome in both the
interdependent and independent conditions, nor did it interact
with the priming conditions. Females were primarily affected by
the mindset prime, and rejected more often when primed with
independence compared to interdependence.
Discussion
Our second study replicated our initial findings of the Mission
prime with a one-shot Ultimatum Game. Males and females
displayed an opposite pattern in the different priming conditions:
males rejected the offer more often when primed with
interdependence, while females rejected the offer more when
primed with independence. The effect proved robust despite
varying experimental conditions: a paper-and pencil hypothetical
study on campus vs. a lab study with performance-contingent
payment. In addition, the data from the two university labs, using
adapted logo and slogan, was similar.
This time, we established a three-way interaction between trait
self-construal, the priming conditions, and gender. Interestingly,
trait self-construal only affected male decision-making. Males
with a higher level of independence rejected the offer more when
primed with interdependence compared to males with a higher
level of interdependence. The interdependent-mindset prime
describes that the participants (and their peers) are expected to
behave in a social manner, taking each other’s goals and priorities
into account. Theoretically, the prime can influence fairness
considerations in two ways: (1) everybody should behave socially,
therefore the anonymous proposer should have proposed a more
fair offer and I reject, or (2) everybody should behave socially,
therefore I should accept the offer instead of punishing. Possibly,
males with a higher level of independence rejected the offer more
often due to the first implicit reasoning, while males with a higher
ratio of interdependence inferred the second. However, an effect
of trait self-construal was only observed in Study 3, and therefore
this finding should be interpreted with caution.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We conducted three studies using self-construal primes to
investigate the downstream consequences of independent vs.
interdependent mindsets on fairness considerations in the
Ultimatum Game. We initially hypothesized that activating
an interdependent mindset would be associated with lower
rejection rates compared to an independent mindset, because
interdependence is connected to motivations relating to conflict
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 April 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 503
Flinkenflogel et al. Priming, Gender, and Fairness Considerations
avoidance, harmony maintenance and social connectedness
(Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Trafimow et al., 1991; Triandis,
1993; Cross and Madson, 1997). However, the results showed
that both the specific self-construal prime as well as participants’
gender mattered.
In line with our hypotheses, Study 1 showed that those in
the interdependent mindset condition (thinking of similarities
with close others) lowered the average rejection rate compared
to those in the independent mindset condition (thinking about
differences with others) and the no-prime control condition—but
only in females. Male decision-making behavior was not affected
by the primes. In contrast, the mission primes in Studies 2 and
3 yielded a reversed effect in males: those in the interdependent
mindset condition (prescribing social behavior among peers),
increased the average rejection rate of the offer compared to
those in the independent mindset condition (prescribing self-
development and prioritization of own goals). In females, the
independent mindset condition increased the rejection rate,
compared to the interdependent condition.
Why did we find these gender differences, even though
participants were cued with the same stimuli? Our findings
suggest that males and females are sensitive to different aspects
of a self-construal prime. Self-construal affects the motives
underlying social-decision making by turning the focus on the
self (independent mindset) or on the relationship with the other
player (interdependent mindset) (Gardner et al., 1999). Consider
the SDFF prime as used in Study 1. Here, the interdependent
mindset prime highlights the relationship with the other player.
Prior work suggests that women are more sensitive to the
relational aspects of interdependence than men (Cross and
Madson, 1997; Maddux and Brewer, 2005). In our Study 1,
bringing close dyadic relationships to mind led women to inhibit
the tendency to punish.
Now consider the mission prime as used in Study 2. Here
the interdependent mindset prime highlights a collective identity,
and prescribes a social norm (i.e., students are expected to act
in a pro-social manner). Previous studies suggest that compared
to women, men are more sensitive to the collective aspects of
interdependence (Kashima et al., 1995; Gabriel and Gardner,
1999). In our Studies 2 and 3, the mission prime may have
elicited an interpretation that everybody should act pro-socially,
according to a collective norm. For females, this resulted in a
similar pattern as Study 1—rejecting the offer relatively less when
primed with interdependence compared to independence. Males
on the other hand rejected the offer more often when presented
with the interdependent prime. One plausible explanation is
that when a collective relationship is salient, males are more
likely than females to perceive unfair offers as transgressions
of group norms, resulting in higher rejection rates. Prior work
indeed indicates that males, more than females, are sensitive to
the collective aspect of interdependence. For example, Van Vugt
et al. (2007) varied intergroup competition in a public goods
game, by either mentioning that performance (i.e., contributions
to the public good) would be assessed at the individual level,
or would be compared to other groups of rival universities.
While female cooperation was equally high across the two
conditions, male cooperation equaled that of females only when
their collective identity was triggered. Maddux and Brewer
(2005) measured levels of trust toward an anonymous other,
framed as either a member of the same university, a different
university, or the university where one of their friends attended
(which could therefore potentially become a future relationship).
Men displayed higher levels of trust to members of their own
university, while women displayed more trust to the potential
relationship target as well as members of their own university.
Studies 1 and 2 both demonstrated the effects of self-construal
priming over and above participants’ trait self-construal levels.
Only in Study 3 participants’ trait self-construal moderated the
interaction between gender and self-construal priming. Primed
with interdependence, males with a higher ratio of independence
rejected the offer on average more often, whereas males with
a higher ratio of interdependence rejected the offer relatively
less often. Possibly, males with a higher level of independence,
as assessed by the TSC, were more inclined to interpret the
interdependent prime as a norm that should be enforced on
others, compared to males with a relatively high level of
interdependence. However, this is a post-hoc interpretation of a
result that was not hypothesized and was observed in one study
only.
Implications and Future Directions
Our findings suggest that men and women differ in their
sensitivity to social cues and that these differences spill over to
their social decisions. As such, they contribute to the literature
in several ways. First, our findings indicate the need to consider
gender as a factor in priming studies. In prior studies, it is
often unclear whether gender differences were taken into account
or just not found. Possibly, the moderating effect of gender
observed in the current studies can be ascribed to the nature of
the dependent variable. Specifically, the Ultimatum Game elicits
strong emotional reactions of anger and disgust (Sanfey et al.,
2003; Sanfey, 2007; Rilling et al., 2008; Tabibnia et al., 2008).
Future studies can usefully investigate if the gender effect occurs
specifically in the context of affective social decision-making.
Second, our findings shed some light on inconsistencies in the
results of previous studies examining gender differences in social
decision-making, which have been identified by two reviews
(Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Eckel
and Grossman (2008) argue that inconsistencies occur because
the inclusion of risk in social dilemma paradigms has a more
pronounced effect of decisions in women than in men, based
on the notion that women may be more risk-averse than men
(Byrnes et al., 1999; Charness and Gneezy, 2012). However, in
a study specifically designed to test this hypothesis, higher risk-
aversion in women did not result in lower rejection rates in
an Ultimatum Game (García-Gallego et al., 2012). According to
Croson and Gneezy (2009), gender differences in social decision
making exist because women are more sensitive to the social cues
when faced with a decision and therefore are more affected by
variations in experimental setups than men, while men display
relative stable behavior. Yet, our study shows that men can be
equally sensitive to contextual cues. A similar observation was
reported by Espinosa and Kovárˇík (2015), after comparing six
studies investigating gender differences in prosocial behavior.
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The authors conclude that both male and female decision-
making is sensitive to experimental variations, with males being
more sensitive to self-reflection, and female behavior to prosocial
framing. We build on their observations by proposing that
both male and female behavior can be sensitive to social cues
and framing, albeit to different aspects within the construct of
interdependence.
Future experimental setups manipulating the emphasis on
dyadic relationships may result primarily in variation in female
behavior, whereas manipulating collective aspects may result in
variation in male behavior. For example, the study by Solnick
(2001) suggested that women had equal or even greaterminimum
acceptable offers, implying that they were more likely to reject
than men. In this study players indicated a minimum acceptable
offer in advance (the so-called strategy method) and did not
directly interact with the other player. In this method, the impact
of the decision on the other player is only indirect, thereby
putting less emphasis on the relationship with the other player.
This may result in a relatively higher rejection rate in females.
In contrast, the study by Eckel and Grossman (2001) not only
used the direct-response method, but also had four players seated
across four other players, and arranged random pairings between
players from each set. This setup plausibly not only led to an
increased the awareness of the effect of the decision on the other
player, but possibly also created a group identity among the four
proposers vs. the four responders. In this study, rejection rate was
higher among men.
Finally, several limitations should be considered. First, the
studies did not include a qualitative measure that provided
insight into the reasoning behind participants’ choice to accept or
reject. We were therefore only able to draw post-hoc inferences of
why each gender responded differently to the primes. However,
a long history of psychological research has established social
dilemmas have high external validity, and are a preferred
choice of measurement as they measure actual behavior rather
than behavioral intentions (Balliet et al., 2011). Theoretical
frameworks like the appropriateness framework (e.g., Weber
et al., 2004) or interdependence theory (e.g., Rusbult and Van
Lange, 2008) assume social decision-making is the result of a
complex line of implicit reasoning resulting frommultiple factors
including identity, situational constraints, and the perceived
relationship between players. Asking participants’ to explain their
reasons to accept or reject does not capture the subtle and often
subconscious reasoning to make a certain choice. Furthermore,
their provided explanation is likely to follow as a post-hoc
rationalization of their choice, rather than an a priori reasoning
to accept or reject. Second, Studies 1 and 2 did not include
a manipulation check to control for what was on participants’
mind. The reason not to include a manipulation check in Study
1 was twofold: the similarities and differences prime has been
successfully used to prime self-construal for the last two decades,
with a well-established effect size (Oyserman and Lee, 2008);
and the content of the provided descriptions of similarities and
differences allowed us to check the effect of the prime. We did
not include a manipulation check in Study 2, but the fact that
the manipulation check in Study 3 using the same prime had
the expected results supports the effectiveness of the prime in
Study 2.
CONCLUSION
The current studies set out to investigate the effect of self-
construal on social decision-making. Our results indicate that
bringing independence or interdependence to mind has distinct
downstream consequences on behavior in de Ultimatum Game,
which are moderated by gender. Specifically, we find that
priming the relational vs. the collective aspect of interdependence
affects female and male behavior respectively. Females are more
responsive to a prime emphasizing dyadic relationships, resulting
in a lower rejection rate when thinking of the similarities rather
than the differences with close others. Male behavior on the
other hand appeared more responsive to a collective prime;
rejecting more when the group norm prescribes to act in a
prosocial way.
In sum, both female and male decision-making is sensitive
to social cues; relationship cues influencing female behavior and
collective cues influencing male behavior. Future studies may
usefully include both types of manipulations, to capture the
full scope of social decision-making differences between gender;
either by framing within the experiment (Maddux and Brewer,
2005; Van Vugt et al., 2007) or as in the current studies, by an
experimentally induced mindset.
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